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Abstract The discourse about traceability in food chains focused on traceability as means
towards the end of managing health risks. This discourse witnessed a call to broaden
traceability to accommodate consumer concerns about foods that are not related to health.
This call envisions the development of ethical traceability. This paper presents a
justification of ethical traceability. The argument is couched in liberal distinctions, since
the call for ethical traceability is based on intuitions about consumer rights to informed
choice. The paper suggests that two versions of ethical traceability find justification. The
first version of ethical traceability entails that governments ensure that all consumers are
provided with foods that respect some threshold level of, e.g., animal welfare that is
supported by an overlapping consensus. The second version of ethical traceability entails
that food producers provide consumers with products, and sufficient information about
these products, that are relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not supported
by an overlapping consensus. Governments should facilitate this in the sense that
consumers are not provided with misinformation about characteristics of foods that are
relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not supported by an overlapping
consensus.
Keywords Consumer concerns . Food ethics . Informed choice . Liberalism . Traceability
1 Introduction
Regulatory and scientific discourse about traceability in food production chains hitherto
predominantly focused on the development of traceability schemes as means towards the
end of managing food-borne health risks. The overall aim of developing traceability
schemes within this context of risk management in production chains has been to ensure
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that consumers can trust that their consumption of food products as provided on the market
is not risky in terms of health consequences.
This regulatory and scientific discourse recently witnessed a call to broaden the
established notion of traceability to accommodate consumer concerns about product and
process characteristics of foods that are not related to health risks. This call envisions the
development of something like ethical traceability. This notion of ethical traceability was
introduced by Coff (2004) and may be defined as “the ability to trace and map ethical
aspects of the food chain by means of recorded identifications” (Coff et al. 2007). It thus
refers to the traceability of ethically relevant product and process characteristics of foods. It
should not be confused either with the idea of ethically responsible food safety traceability
or with the idea of a moral HACCP that looks at human failure as a critical control point
(Hirschauer 2004).1
Before engaging in the development of ethical traceability schemes, however, the first
question in need of serious scrutiny is the question of why ethical traceability might be a
worthwhile objective in the context of the pursuit of a new social contract between food
producers, consumers and society at large. In other words, a justification discourse about ethical
traceability needs to precede an application discourse. This paper presents a contribution to the
justification of ethical traceability. The main line or argument is couched in terms of some basic
liberal distinctions, since the call for ethical traceability seems to be based first and foremost on
intuitions about consumer rights to informed choice on the food market. This paper is rather
strongly embedded in liberal political philosophy as developed – partly in discussion with
communitarian and utilitarian political philosophies – after Rawls (1972).2 Although consumer
freedom is high on the agenda of socio-political debate, this paper explores relatively
unknown territory.3
The paper starts by introducing the liberal distinctions to be used subsequently. It then
argues that the operational domain for ethical traceability should be positioned somewhere
between needs like food safety that entail positive unconditional rights of consumers and
positive unconditional duties of producers and regulators with respect to the provision and
traceability of food products, and non-reasonable and/or superficial wants with respect to
food that do not entail any rights and duties. The basic argument is that ethical traceability
is operational within the domain of reasonable and non-superficial wants with respect to
food, which entail conditional rights of consumers and conditional duties of producers and
regulators.
2 Some Basic Liberal Distinctions
This section introduces some basic liberal distinctions that inform the main line of argument
in this paper (see Table 1). It offers definitions – or rather circumscriptions – of the key
terms that are hopefully non-controversial enough to be acceptable for everyone
1Moral traceability might be a better wording than ethical traceability for scholars with a preference for a
more strict distinction between ethical theory and moral practice but this paper prefers to follow the original
notion as coined by Coff (2004) and used in the European project ‘Ethical traceability and informed choice in
food ethical issues.’
2Kymlicka (1990) provides a good introduction to the main discussions within contemporary political
philosophy.
3Four of the few academic papers critically analysing autonomy or freedom of choice in a (food) market
context are Beekman (2000), Brom (2000), Rippe (2000) and Korthals (2001).
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subscribing to the basic values (liberty, equality and fraternity) of modern liberal-
democratic European societies.
This paper embraces a pragmatic and modestly perfectionist version of liberalism. It
accepts, on the one hand, that in pluralistic democratic societies people have divergent
perfectionist visions of the good life but acknowledges, on the other hand, that such
societies need to share some minimal basic values. The main pragmatic reason to embrace a
modestly perfectionist version of liberalism is that a political philosophy should try to build
upon as much of the common morality as possible without becoming controversial. More
anti-perfectionist versions of liberalism tend to ignore some shared values, whereas more
perfectionist versions of liberalism tend to ignore some divergence.4
It should be clear that liberalism has quite different connotations in – analytical –
political philosophy and in day-to-day European politics. Basically, one could say that new
labour, green realos and left-wing Christian-democrats and liberals at least implicitly
embrace such a pragmatic and modestly perfectionist liberalism, whereas old labour, green
fundis and right-wing Christian-democrats and liberals accept these minimal basic values
but strive after divergent varieties of a fuller perfectionism in public morality. Left- and
right-wing populists and fundamentalists, finally, do not even subscribe to one or more of
the minimal liberal values.
2.1 Needs and Wants
This paper uses the noun ‘need’ to refer to things that are always necessary for survival no
matter where or when one lives or what specific values one might adhere to. The noun
‘want,’ on the other hand, refers to things that are only necessary in specific spatial or
temporal contexts or for the pursuit of certain specific values. Some scholars might question
the very existence of universal (i.e. non-contingent) needs. However, such a full-blown
Table 1 Some basic liberal distinctions
Needs Wants
Traceability Traceability Ethical traceability
as a management
tool
Ethical traceability as a
communication tool
No traceability
Values Food safety Reasonable, non-
superficial and
overlapping food
values
Reasonable, non-
superficial and non-
overlapping food values
Non-reasonable
and/or
superficial
food values
Consumers Positive unconditional
right to be provided with
safe foods
Positive conditional
right to be
provided with
foods
Negative conditional
right to be provided
with information about
foods
No rights
Producers Positive unconditional duty
to provide safe foods
Positive conditional
duty to provide
foods
Negative conditional
duty to provide
information about foods
No duties
Regulators Positive unconditional duty
to ensure food safety with
traceability regulation
Positive conditional
duty to regulate
ethical traceability
Negative conditional
duty to facilitate ethical
traceability
No duties
4Prominent proponents of a pragmatic and modestly perfectionist liberalism are United States’ former
President Clinton’s advisor Selznick (1992) and United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Blair’s advisor Giddens
(1998).
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scepticism would result in the reductio ad absurdum that denies the harsh reality of some
primary goods (to use a Rawlsian term) as being necessary for human survival.
2.2 Rights and Duties
This paper uses the noun ‘right’ to indicate that someone is entitled to do or not do
something, or to have or not have something being done to him or her. The noun ‘duty,’ on
the other hand, indicates that someone has an obligation (not) to provide or do something to
someone else. If someone has a right, someone else must have a corresponding duty. If this
were not the case, rights would be empty and loose their meaning. It is however not true, as
some intuitive accounts would argue, that for someone to have rights assumes that he/she
also has duties. One should recognise that the rights/duties vocabulary is one of the
strongest in ethics and political philosophy. This is both the power and the weakness of this
vocabulary. The rights/duties vocabulary requires strict reasoning and only claims
applicability in the domain of the mandatory. The absence of certain rights/duties thus
does not imply that it could not be a good idea to arrange certain things in the domain of the
voluntary.
2.3 Conditional and Unconditional
This paper uses the adjective ‘unconditional’ to indicate that some right or duty holds
always and everywhere without further qualification in terms of a provided that or unless
clause. The adjective ‘conditional,’ on the other hand, thus indicates that some right or duty
is indeed qualified by such a provided that or unless clause.
2.4 Positive and Negative
This paper uses the adjective ‘negative’ to indicate a duty to refrain from or a right to be
restrained from interference with some choice. To have a negative duty thus basically says
that you should not do something, whereas a negative right says that something should not
be done to you. The adjective ‘positive’ on the other hand indicates that you are entitled to
(do) something (positive right) or that someone else owes (or must do) something to you
(positive duty).
2.5 Reasonable and Non-reasonable
This paper uses the adjective ‘reasonable’ first and foremost in the rather modest sense that
values and consumptive choices will qualify as reasonable, if people arrived at those values
and choices under conditions of adequate information or knowledge and on properly
functioning markets. The properly functioning clause is the market equivalent of the
Rawlsian well-ordered clause in well-ordered societies. Just as it does not make much sense
to talk about justice in a political context that simply does not ensure some basic democratic
values, it does not make much sense to talk about reason in a market context that simply
does not ensure a level playing field between competitors, i.e. prices need to reflect costs.5
Furthermore the adjective ‘reasonable’ is restricted to the (egalitarian) realm of values
and choices that do not harm others (harm principle) (Feinberg 1987) and do not entail
5This is perfectly in line with the idea of a negative morality as defended by Honneth (1995) and Allen
(2001).
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negative repercussions on distributive justice (justice principle) (Rawls 1972). This
restriction is indeed only acceptable for people with a willingness to embrace the basic
values of liberty and justice for all. The adjective ‘non-reasonable,’ on the other hand, thus
indicates that some value or consumptive choice does not meet even a rather limited
interpretation of rationality or is at odds with respect for the harm or justice principles.
2.6 Superficial and Non-superficial
This paper uses the adjective ‘non-superficial’ to indicate that some consumptive value or
preference is an expression of some vision of the right or the good, which implies that not
being able to act upon that value has negative repercussions for the constitution of some
individual or collective identity. The adjective ‘superficial,’ on the other hand, is reserved
for the more shallow preferences without such existential connotations.
2.7 Overlapping and Non-overlapping
This paper uses the adjective ‘overlapping’ to indicate that some value is shared and non-
controversial within some society that is otherwise pluralistic on moral issues. The adjective
‘non-overlapping,’ on the other hand indicates that some value is controversial and thus not
shared by all people in a certain society.6
2.8 Providing and Tracing
This paper uses the verbs ‘providing’ and ‘tracing’ to distinguish between the product and
information parts of the product-information combinations that are the subject of divergent
traceability schemes. It is, however, important to acknowledge that traceability schemes are
always about a ‘package deal’ of providing products and tracing information.
2.9 Regulating and Facilitating
This paper uses the verbs ‘regulating’ and ‘facilitating’ to distinguish between directive and
non-directive strategies of government intervention in food markets. Whereas the former
strategies oblige market actors to behave in certain ways, the latter strategies merely entice
these actors into certain practices. Regulating is thus a strategy of public management in the
mandatory domain, whereas facilitating is a strategy of public-private governance in the
voluntary domain.
2.10 Consumers, Producers and Regulators
This paper uses the noun ‘consumers’ for the people buying, preparing and eating foods that are
grown, processed and sold by people referred to as ‘producers.’ The noun ‘regulators’ is
reserved for people in public, private or public-private bodies that somehow have a
responsibility to contribute to a properly functioning market exchange between consumers
6A first indication of what values are overlapping – and the same holds true for what values are reasonable
and non-superficial – in a certain liberal-democratic society is to be found in the relative popularity of the
different political parties in the elections for its representative institutions (i.e. the parliament). This
knowledge may be deepened by engaging citizens/consumers in participatory processes of opinion-formation
(see: Beekman et al. 2006) and with qualitative and quantitative social scientific studies using methods like
focus groups, in-depth interviews and surveys.
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and producers. This paper basically tries to argue which rights to informed choice consumers
might have and then formulates the corresponding duties of producers and regulators. It is,
however, important to recognise that the development of ethical traceability schemes should be
based on a balanced account of rights and duties among all affected parties.
3 Traceability of Food Safety
3.1 Rights of Consumers
No doubt seems to exist that each and every consumer needs safe food. This need does not
vary with the context of consumption and thus does not require any further qualification.
This implies that consumers have a positive unconditional right to be provided with safe
food products. This would hold true even if historically – and geographically – the right to
safe food has not always – and everywhere – been recognised as such.
3.2 Duties of Producers
If consumers have a positive unconditional right to be provided with safe food products,
producers will have a positive unconditional duty to provide safe food products. This duty
is only qualified by a non-moral clause that what counts as safe is always contingent upon
available knowledge. This means that a duty to provide safe food products does not call
upon producers to strive after a theoretically and practically unfeasible zero-risk. It does call
upon producers to minimise food-borne health risks. Furthermore, in a context of food
production chains with more than two links the duty to provide safe food products implies a
further duty to trace information about the safety of food products.
3.3 Duties of Regulators
If needs inform rights and duties of different groups of actors in society, it will be the duty
of regulators in a well-ordered liberal-democratic society to ensure that rights are respected
by corresponding duties. This implies that with respect to consumers’ right to safe food
products, in a context of food production chains with more than two links, regulators have
positive unconditional duties to secure the safety of food products by developing and
enforcing traceability regulations. The whole argument about traceability and food safety is
focused on the provision of safe products and the provision of information is only
instrumental to that objective.
4 Non-reasonable and/or Superficial Food Values
Moving from the domain of needs to the domain of wants, it is not too difficult to see that
not all wants or values with respect to food offer sound reasons to argue for rights and
duties on the part of different groups of actors. Two borderline cases should suffice to
clarify this point. First, nobody will disagree that a cannibal does not have a valid claim to
be provided with meat from involuntarily farmed humans. Some food values are simply
beyond the realm of permissible values within well-ordered, liberal-democratic societies
because they impose infringements on the harm principle or the justice principle. It is of
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course contingent where the exact demarcation between reasonable and non-reasonable
food values is to be drawn.
Second, nobody will disagree that someone’s preference for blackberries and distaste for
blueberries does not provide sufficient reason to claim a right to be provided with
blackberry pudding. Talking about rights and duties would lose any meaning if it were not
confined to values that transgress some level of superficiality. Again, the exact demarcation
between superficial and non-superficial values is of course a matter of contingent discourse.
5 Reasonable and Non-superficial Food Values
It seems that in contemporary European societies the whole plethora of consumer concerns
that count as expressions of reasonable and non-superficial food values could be
summarised into six categories (see, e.g., Beekman et al. 2006):
& Concerns about impacts on public and personal health;
& Concerns about impacts of genetic modification;
& Concerns about impacts on animal welfare;
& Concerns about impacts on the natural environment;
& Concerns about impacts on international justice;
& Concerns about the preservation of regional foods.
It is important to acknowledge a relevant difference between the first two concerns
(health and genetic modification) and the last four concerns. Whereas it is perfectly possible
to test products to ensure the accuracy of information about food safety or genetically
modified ingredients, such a proof of the pudding is not available for the latter concerns. In
colloquial terms, animal-friendly and animal-unfriendly, environment-friendly and
environment-unfriendly, fairly traded and unfairly traded, and regional and blended food
products are substantially equivalent, i.e. such differences in production processes do not
impact on the biochemical properties of food products. These qualities can only be verified
with the help of recorded identifications of product (hi)stories through the food chain.
All six concerns might be classified as substantive or end concerns to distinguish them
from procedural or instrumental concerns about things like transparency, involvement,
responsibility, trustworthiness and authenticity. Bluntly speaking, people mostly have
procedural concerns because they are substantively concerned about public and personal
health, genetic modification, animal welfare, the natural environment, international justice
or regional foods. That is why procedural concerns may also be described as instrumental
concerns, and that is why it is rather meaningless to discuss these concerns independently
of the substantive or end concerns. This would be a confusion of ends and means. Whereas
the substantive concerns refer to reasonableness in terms of the harm and justice principles,
the procedural concerns refer to reasonableness in terms of adequate information/
knowledge and properly functioning markets.
All six concerns share the characteristic that they go beyond merely personal interests like
availability, convenience, price and taste. They are thus properly termed moral concerns.
5.1 Rights of Consumers
The fact – or assumption – of value pluralism within contemporary affluent societies implies
that more than one set or hierarchy of reasonable and non-superficial food values exists or might
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exist. However, this does not yet seem enough to argue that consumers have a positive
conditional right to be provided with food products that meet their values. It does seem
reasonable to argue that consumers have a negative conditional right not to be – deliberately –
misinformed about morally relevant product or process characteristics of foods.
However, one should not ignore the possibility of the existence of some overlapping
consensus that holds that, e.g., eggs, meat and milk from livestock production systems
should adhere to some minimal standard of animal welfare.7 Then, the focus changes
from information to products and it does seem reasonable to argue that such cases call for
a positive conditional right to be provided with certain foods. The condition is, of course,
that – unlike needs such as food safety – these overlapping values are contingent.
5.2 Duties of Producers
If consumers have a negative conditional right not to be – deliberately – misinformed about
product and process characteristics that are relevant for some reasonable, non-superficial
and non-overlapping food value, it will follow that producers have a corresponding
negative conditional duty not to misinform consumers about these characteristics of their
food products. The impacts of this duty are actually rather strong, since it would imply
considerable changes to prevailing marketing practices.
5.3 Duties of Regulators
Negative conditional rights and duties, on the one hand, call upon the government to
develop regulatory assurances that these rights are respected by corresponding duties. The
duty of regulators is, on the other hand, to regulate the development of ethical traceability
schemes as means towards the end of establishing market niches or segments for consumers
and producers with similar food values.
6 Concerns About Impacts of Genetic Modification
It might be wise to provide some further clarification of these points by exploring three
possible consumer concerns with respect to the much-debated yet ill-understood case of
foods with genetically modified (GM) ingredients.8
6.1 Health
First, it might be possible to have concerns about negative repercussions of foods with GM
ingredients for public or personal health. If these concerns are at least supported by enough
7The development of an animal welfare monitoring, traceability and labelling scheme is the subject of the
European project ‘Welfare Quality’ (see: http://www.welfarequality.net).
8See, e.g., Hansen (2004) for an unconvincing argument that with respect to consumer autonomy no morally
relevant difference exists between negative and positive labelling of foods with GM ingredients, and Rubel
and Streiffer (2005) for a reply with an equally unconvincing argument that respecting consumer autonomy
calls for positive labelling of foods with GM ingredients. Much of the confusion in this debate results from
the fact that what counts as a positive or a negative label depends on an account of normalcy. When using
GM ingredients is the normal situation, the absence of such ingredients is a positive product attribute for
people with particular food values. Hence, in this situation that very much resembles real life, a ‘non-GM’
label would qualify as a positive and not as a negative label.
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scientific uncertainty about such risks to call upon a precautionary approach, the issue will
become a case of needs with a negative unconditional right of consumers not to be provided
with foods with GM ingredients until their safety has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. Producers and regulators will then have the corresponding negative unconditional
duties. If these concerns are not supported by some scientific uncertainty, as seems to be the
case in real life (see: Kuiper et al. (eds.) 2004), the issue will become a case of non-
reasonable concerns with no rights for consumers and no duties for producers and
regulators. This first possibility could thus be translated into cases of either needs or non-
reasonable wants.
6.2 Justice
Second, it might be possible to have concerns about negative repercussions of foods with
GM ingredients for either developing countries (an issue of intragenerational justice) or the
natural environment (an issue of intergenerational justice). This is where old-school
Rawlsians (following ‘A theory of justice,’ Rawls 1972) and new-school Rawlsians
(following ‘Political liberalism,’ Rawls 1993) will part. The first group of liberals would
argue that it is enough to imagine a hypothetical overlapping consensus on the principles of
intra- and intergenerational justice that could be reached, if the power of reasonable
argument determined the outcome of socio-political discussions. The second group of
liberals would argue that one needs an actual overlapping consensus to support positive
conditional rights of consumers to be provided with foods without GM ingredients and to
support the corresponding positive conditional duties of producers and regulators.
6.3 Naturalness
Third, it might be possible to have concerns about foods with GM ingredients because they
interfere with either the order of nature or the creation of God. Such concerns are often
voiced in public debate but they cannot count on a supportive overlapping consensus. This
is where anti-perfectionist Rawlsian liberals, perfectionist liberals (e.g. Raz 1986) and
perfectionist communitarians part. The difference between perfectionists and anti-
perfectionists is that the latter argue that governments should somehow be neutral with
respect to different visions of the good life, whereas the former argue that governments
should be allowed to promote one or more specific visions of the good life.9
Anti-perfectionist liberals cannot see how producers and regulators in liberal-democratic
societies could have positive conditional duties to ensure the preservation of the specific
visions of the good that inform such concerns. They do, however, acknowledge the existence
of negative conditional duties of producers and regulators that should ensure that consumers
with these food values are not misinformed on labels that qualify certain foods as non-GM.
Perfectionist liberals, on the contrary, do believe that producers and regulators have positive
conditional duties to ensure opportunities to choose from a wide range of, e.g., regional foods.
Otherwise consumers’ freedom of choice would be an empty right. Communitarians even
believe that producers and regulators have positive conditional duties to ensure the
preservation of specific visions of the good. Hitherto, however, no convincing arguments
have been formulated that this latter communitarian position could be in accordance with
liberal-democratic governments.
9Wall and Klosko (2003) edited a collection of essays that offers a good introduction to the perfectionism
debate in liberal political philosophy.
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7 Overlapping and Non-overlapping Food Values
The above explorations might be summarised in more general terms – transgressing the
case of foods with GM ingredients – by distinguishing two sub-categories of reasonable and
non-superficial food values.
If these values are supported by an overlapping consensus, ethical traceability should be
developed as a public management, or business-to-business, tool to achieve the wanted
changes in food production processes. It seems that concerns about animal welfare, the
natural environment and international justice are based on overlapping, reasonable and non-
superficial food values in present-day European societies. These concerns thus warrant
regulatory enforcement of certain minimum standards of animal welfare, environment-
friendliness and fair trade. Actually, this is not a case of informed choice but of reduced
choice; the objective being to remove animal-unfriendly, environment-unfriendly and
unfairly traded food products from the shelves of the supermarket. This implies that with
respect to overlapping, reasonable and non-superficial food values, liberal-democratic
governments are justified to enforce certain moral standards of production with rules and
regulations. In a context of food production chains with more than two links this
furthermore implies an obligation to record information about these standards of production
by means of ethical traceability schemes.
If these values, on the other hand, are not supported by an overlapping consensus, ethical
traceability should be developed as a public-private governance, or business-to-consumer,
tool to achieve the wanted changes in food information processes. The private side of this
governance tool consists of voluntary positive labelling and tracing of food products with
specific ethically relevant product and process characteristics (e.g. region of origin or higher
than minimum standards of animal welfare, environment-friendliness and fair trade). The
public side of this governance tool consists of safeguarding consumers’ negative
conditional right not be misinformed by corporate marketing. Without this negative right
there would be no point in positive labelling, since consumers would then not be able to
judge the trustworthiness of the claims on food products. Notice also that a positive
conditional information right, which would call for mandatory positive labelling, is almost
too absurd to be discussed. Consider, for example, the case of a producer of environment-
friendly candy bars, who is for some reason unwilling to label these candy bars as
environment-friendly – this is a real life case! Why on earth, and how in practical terms
should and could a government enforce positive labelling upon this producer?
8 Conclusion
The whole argument of this paper suggests that two versions of ethical traceability find
justification. The first is ethical traceability as a public management tool, used to ensure that
consumers are provided with foods that respect some threshold level of animal welfare,
sustainability (natural environment) or fair trade (international justice), as supported by a
contingent overlapping consensus of food values (several Eurobarometer studies suggest
that such an overlapping consensus on these issues indeed exists). Such ethical traceability
schemes are intended to ensure that corporate standards and quality assurances are verified
by documented product (hi)stories. Concerns about public and personal health are excluded
here, since food safety is not a want but a need and thus already covered by traceability
schemes without the adjective ‘ethical.’ Concerns about genetic modification are excluded
from this whole market application domain, since these concerns are not supported by an
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overlapping food value consensus. Concerns about regional foods are excluded from the
whole market application domain, since it is fundamental to the nature of these concerns
that they are only applied to specific food products.
The second version is ethical traceability as a public-private governance tool, used to
allow certain consumers to be provided with food products, and sufficient information
about these products, that are relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not
supported by an overlapping consensus. Governments should then facilitate this in the
sense that consumers are not provided with misinformation about product and process
characteristics of foods that are relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not
supported by an overlapping consensus in contemporary European market democracies.
It is important to notice that these justified versions of ethical traceability should both
speak about product-information combinations (and not merely about information), and that
in both justified versions of ethical traceability improvements in the tracing of information
are instrumental to improvements in the provision of products with some substantive added
value. The question then arises of what the two distinguished ethical traceability regimes –
as management and governance tool respectively – might look like. Table 2 thus spells out
the details of the two versions of ethical traceability.
The second version of ethical traceability might be further developed in terms of policy
recommendations with respect to the development of ethical traceability schemes for
specified niche markets. It is important to rebut the common misunderstanding that niche
markets are small. The defining characteristic of a niche market is that it is a meeting place
for just one segment of producers and consumers. This segment might be or become a quite
large portion of the whole market. Criteria and indicators need to be developed for a (higher
than minimum) standard of labelled food products for specified niche markets.
Furthermore, the nature of the demand for and provision of information by consumers,
Table 2 Two versions of ethical traceability
Ethical traceability as a management tool Ethical traceability as communication tool
Values Reasonable, non-superficial and overlapping
food values
Reasonable, non-superficial and non-
overlapping food values
Application
domain
Whole market Niche markets
Who All producers Some consumers and producers
Concerns Animal welfare Genetic modification
Natural environment Animal welfare
International justice Natural environment
International justice
Regional foods
Standard Minimum Higher
Emphasis Products Information
Labelling No Yes
Responsibilities
consumers
None Willingness to pay higher prices for
labelled foods with specific product or
process characteristics
Responsibilities
regulators
Develop, apply and enforce regulations to
guarantee specific product and process
characteristics of foods
Develop, apply and enforce regulations
about labelling of foods with specific
product and process characteristics
Responsibilities
producers
Obey regulations Truthful labelling
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retailers, food processing companies, farmers and input companies (e.g. feed and seed) need
to be spelled out. Together these criteria, indicators, information flows specify ethical
traceability schemes.
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